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SITUATION

III

CpNTIGUOUS ZONES, AIRPLANES, AND
NEUTRALITY
State K has a leased area and has constructed a
canal in State L upon terms· identical with those
existing between the United States and Pa11ama.
States U and V are at war. States K and L have
issued declarations of neutrality. The Dominion
of Vinta, which has the same relationship with
State V that the British Dominions have with the
United Kingdom, has issued a statement to the effect that it will abstain from participation in the
war. State K has declared a ''protective zone,''
extending for a radius of 100 miles to sea from both
exits of the canal, in which all naval and military
craft of any state are forbidden to hover or navigate unless intending to pass directly to or from the
canal.
(a) The Vera, a n1erchant vessel of Vinta, is
attacked 'vhen 75 miles from the canal by the
U1Lion, a cruiser of State U. The Vera asks for
protection from the Komlo, a crt1iser of State K,
which is nearby.
(b) The Vincent, a cruiser of Vinta, remains in
one of the canal ports for several days. State U
protests to State K that the V ince'nt should be
treated as a belligerent vessel.
(c) The Vigo, a cruiser of State V, while 011 patrol duty 110 miles from the canal, sends an airpla11e, the lT-1, to a port i11 the canal zone for
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11eeded medical supplies. The V -1 takes back not
only the medical supplies but also the naval attache of the legation of State V in State L who
has important inforn1ation for the Vigo. State
U protests to State K that the latter has failed to
fulfill its 11eutrality obligations by permitting the
airplane and the attache to depart.
(d) States, L, U, and V protest to State K that
the ''protective zone'' is illegal.
What are the legal rights in each case~
SOLUTION

(a) The commander of the Ko1nlo should act to
protect the Vera, thus conforming to the domestic
law of his own State. The legality of the protective zone under international law depends 11pon
its accepta11ce by other powers. In this instance,
therefore, the protective zone is not recognized by
international law and State U may attempt to
hold State I{ internationally responsible.
(b) It is legally possible for Vinta to be a neutral
State. If the Dominion of Vinta. is recognized as
a neutral by the belligerents, the V i1~cent may reInain in the canal ports indefi11itely.
(c) The V -1 has no right to e11ter neutral jurisdiction and the authorities of State K in the Canal
Zone should have used the means at their disposal
to prevent the departure of V -1.
(d) States L, U, and V are not obliged to recognize the zone and their protests are legally valid.
NOTES
CONTIGUOUS ZONES

It is generally agreed that 3 n1iles is the ntini1nttm limit of territorial waters. Tl1e Interna-
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tional Codification Conference at The Hague in
1930 demonstrated that there is no universal agreement upon the ttnax-imum extent of the littoral
state's authority. The United States regards 3
miles as the limit of American jurisdiction, but
other powers have made claims for wider belts.
(See Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1928, and Harvard Draft Code, Territorial
Waters, American Journal of International Law,
Supplement, April1929.) Within territorial waters, whatever may be their width, it is agreed that
the State exercises complete jurisdiction, but beyond the marginal seas, international law recognizes an attenuated or more limited kind of
jurisdiction for special purposes. As Gidel says:
"There is a maritime area beyond the limits of territorial
waters, for an unspecified distance, in which the shore state
possesses a certain jurisdiction over foreign vessels, a jurisdiction Tigorously limited to specific objects."
(Le Droit International Public de la Mer, p. 361.)

Fixed or ·exact limits for the special contiguous
areas do not exist. International law has simply
recognized that in certain circumstances for limited
purposes littoral states may extend their jurisdiction beyond territorial waters, and the limits of
these areas vary and have varied greatly. Whether
a contiguous zone is to be recognized in international law depends upon the willingness of other
nations to accept the claims of a state making
pretentious to st1cl1 long-range jurisdiction. The
law of nations recognizes the contiguous zone in
principle, but fixes 110 bounds for it and does not
specify in a11y comprehensive fasl1ion as to type
or kind. Each claim to a zone must be exami11ecl
individually, and it is a characteristic of these areas
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that their legal basis rests upo11 the attitude of
foreign states in each case. Any new claim to jurisdiction over foreign ships beyo11d the custo1nary
marginal limits may 1neet with the objection of
the foreign state or states affected. If the latter
refuse to accord recog11ition, they may legally assert
that the zone has no legal standing; if they give
consent, either expressly or by failure, over a period of tin1e, to make protest, the special area may
be said to have been accepted as internationally
valid.
.A littoral state, therefore, has full jurisdiction
for at least three miles and a limited and much modified jurisdiction for an indefinite number of miles
beyond that. In the past, international law has
recognized contiguous zones mainly for customs
and fiscal purposes and only more rece11tly has
begun to take account of special jurisdiction for
defensive or neutrality purposes. There is 110thing
new, therefore, about the contiguous zone in priilciple; what is apt to be new is the atte111pt of a
state to apply tl1e principle over a11 area or in
regard to certain acts which otl1er powers n1ay not
find acceptable. The declaratio11 of authority n1 a
contiguous zone is therefore not necessarily biilding upon other 11ations initially. Through acceptance, tacit or overt, it 1nay con1e to be recognized
jn the law of nations, or through rejection it may
fail to obtain legal standing.
HISTORY OF CONTIGUOUS ZONES

It was in the realm of customs and finance that
special areas of jurisdictio11 beyond the normal
li1nits first came to be recognized in international
la,v. Britisl1 legislation of 1718 gave revenue au-
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thorities permission to board vessels intending to
enter British ports at a distance considerably beyond 3 miles. A similar law of 1784 specified 12
miles, and an act of 1805 declared a zone of 300
miles in 'vhicl1 British ships, or vessels of certain
foreign states, coming from certain countries
loaded with certain goods of a certain quantity
might be inspected by government agents. By
legislation in 1853 and 1876 Great Britain abandoned all such efforts to control hovering and
smuggling beyond the 3-mile limit, but the United
States in 1790 and 1799 passed so-called hovering
laws, modelled upon earlier British statutes, which
l)ermitted American revenue authorities to board
foreign ships destined for an American port up
to a distance of 12 miles from shore. The American Tariff Act of 1922 gave boarding rights within
12 miles even if the foreign craft had no intention
of entering an American port. The treaties between the United States and other nations in 1924
granted American agents boarding rights within
1 hour's sailing distance from shore.
It must be emphasized that these rights within
12 miles or within 1 hour's sailing distance are
strictly limited and do not grant the United States
the complete jurisdiction which it of course possesses within the narrower band of territorial seas.
It should also be stressed that the legislation just
described was at first purely British or American
domestic law and by no means constituted a part
of international law. Through the years, however,
American and British practice under these statutes was accepted by other nations which in their
turn have enacted comparable legislation. In 1936
every state in the 'vorld except Great Britain, J a-
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pan, the N etl1erlands, Portugal, Y llgoslavia, and
Colombia had special customs zones. The practice
and llsage of nations therefore recognizes contiguous zones for customs purposes. In 1935 the
United States enacted an antismuggling act (49
U. S. Stat. at Large, pt. 1, p. 517) 'vhich gave the
President authority to proclaim so-called ''customs
enforcement areas'' up to a distance 62 miles from
the coast. Inasmuch as other states have not challenged the validity of this legislation it appears to
have been regarded as not being incompatible with
international law. This example well illustrates
the point that customs areas have been accepted in
principle and that each domestic alteration and extension depends upon the sufferance of other states.
(For further n1formation on contiguous zones in
general and customs areas in particular see Gidel
op. cit. ; Harvard Draft Code on Territorial W aters, op. cit.)
CONTIGUOUS ZONES FOR DEFENSE AND
OTHER PURPOSES

Whether international law recognizes contiguous
zones in principal for other than customs purposes
is more problematical, but such areas for purposes
of sanitation, security, and national defense have
definitely acquired some standing. As early as 1804
Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Church vs.
Hubbart (2 Cranch 187) declared that the power
of a nation "to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.'' In 1864 the Government of France asked
that the battle between the Alaban~a and the Kea1·-
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sarge be fought at a safe distance (more than 3
miles) from the French coast, and in 1915 and 1916
the United States Governme11t requested the British to order their vvarships not to hover close in
to the 3-mile lil1e. Though in each of these instances the requests 'vere made and acceded to upon
the basis of comity and not of legal right, they
were indicative of a trend. (For an account of
the hovering by British warships during the last
'var see Naval War College, International Law
Situations, 1928, page 31.) By an act March 4.
1917 (39 Stat. 1194; Naval War College Situations,
1918, p. 162) the United States proclaimed ce~tain
4
'defensive sea areas" and on August 27, 1917, a
f"imilar sort of ''defensive sea area'' was proclaimed
for Panama. (U. S. Off. Bull. 99, p. 8.) Though
the zones inclllcled llnder these proclamations were
not very extensive, the maximum width being only
13 1niles, these "defense areas'' constituted an imlJortant precedent and, having been apparently unchallenged, are of significance for the development
of the principle of contiguous zones for defense
purposes.
The Harvard Draft Code on Rights and Duties
of Neutral States, op. cit., recognizes the principle
of neutral jurisdiction for protective purposes beyond 3 miles:
18. A belligerent shall not engage in hostile operations on, under or over the high seas so near to the territory of a neutral State as to endanger life or property
therein.
ARTicLE 19. A belligerent shall not pern1it its warships
or military aircraft to hover off the coasts of a neutral
State in such n1anner as to harass the cotrunerce or industry
of that State.
ARTICLE
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THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA, OCTOBER 3,

1939
The Governments of the American Republics meeting at
Panama, have solemnly ratified their neutral status in the
conflict 'vhich is disrupting the peace of Europe, but the present war may lead to unexpected results 'vhich may affect the
fundamental interests of America and there can be no
justification for the interests of the belligerents to prevail
over the rights of neutrals causing disturbances and suffering to nations which by their neutrality in the conflict and their distance from the scene of events, should not
be burdened with its fatal and painful consequences.
During the World War of 1914--1918 the Governments
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
advanced, or supported, individual proposals providing in
principle a declaration by the American Republics that the
belligerent nations must refrain from committing hostile
acts within a reasonable distance from their shores.
The nature of the present conflagration, in spite of its already lamentable proportions, would not justify any obstruction to inter-American communications which, engendered
by important interests, call for adequate protection. This
fact requires the demarcation of a zone of security including
all the nonnal maritime routes of communication and trade
between the countries of America.
To this end it is essential as a n1easure of necessity to
adopt immediately provisions based on the above-mentioned
precedents for the safeguarding of such interests, in order
to avoid a repitition of the damages and sufferings sustained by the American nations and by their citizens in the
war of 1914--1918.
There is no doubt that the Governments of the American
Republics must foresee those dangers and as a measure of
self-protection insist that the 'vaters to a reasonable distance
from their coasts shall remain free from the commission of
hostile acts or from the undertaking of belligerent activities
by nations engaged in a war in 'vhich the said governments
are not involved.
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For these reasons the Governn1ents of the American Republics RESOLVE AND HEREBY DECLARE:
1. As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality,
are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent
to the American continent, which they regard as of primary
concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the
commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made
from land, sea or air.
Such waters shall be defined as follows. All waters comprised within the limits set forth hereafter except the territoTial waters of Canada and of the undisputed colonies
and possessions of European countries within these limits:
Beginning at the terminus of the United States-Canada
boundary in Passamaquoddy Bay, in 44°46'36" north latitude, and 66 o 54'11" west longitude;
Thence due east along the parallel 44°46'36" to a point
60° west of Greenwich;
Thence due south to a point in 20° north latitude;
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 5° north latitude,
24° west longitude;
Thence due south to a point in 20° south latitude;
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 58° south latitude,
57° west longitude;
Thence due west to a point in 80° west longitude;
Thence by a rhumb line to a point on the equator in 97°
west longitude;
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 15° north latitude,
120° west longitude;
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 48°29'38" north
latitude, 136 o west longitude;
Thence due east to the Pacific terminus of the United
States-Canada boundary in the Strait of Juan de Fuca.
2. The Governments of the American Republics agree that
they will endeavor, through joint representation to such
belligerents as may now or in the future be engaged in hostilities, to secure the compliance by them with the provisions
of this Declaration, without prejudice to the exercise of
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the individual rights of each State inherent in their sovereignty.
3. The Governn1ents of the An1erican Republics further
declare that whenever they consider it necessary they will
consult together to determine upon the n1easures which they
1nay individually or collectively undertake in order to secure
the observance of the provisions of this Declaration.
4. The America} Republics, during the existence of a state
of 'var in which they themselves are not involved, may
undertake, whenever they 1nay determine that the need therefor exists, to patrol, either individually or collectively, as
may be agreed upon by common consent, and insofar as the
1neans and resources of each 1nay permit, the 'vaters adjacent
to their coasts within the area above defined.
(Deparbnent of State Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 15, October 7,
1939, pp. 331-333.)

BRITISH ADMIRALTY STATEMENT ON THE
PANAMA DECLARATION
Several unofficial reports have heM received recently of
the important decisions reached at the Panan1a conference of
the republics of America. These reports are to the effect
that a neutral or safety zone of variously stated depth from
the coast is to be established.
It is understood that the zone is in no 'vay intended as an
extension of territoral waters, but belligerents are to be
invited to accept the limitation of their operations which
'vould be involved by the scheme. This is clearly the wisest
way of proceeding, since while belligerents, and particularly
the Allies, n1ay be anxious to assist all neutral countries in
keeping war from the proximity of their coasts, it 1nust be
for them to decide whether or not to accept restrictions
'vhich would limit their enjoyment of certain 'veil-established
rights.
Neutral States are entitled and bound to de1nand that
belligerents shall abstain from hostilities in their territorial
"raters and it is not a hostile act if a neutral repels even by
force an attack upon his neutrality. During the great war
N or,vay, Sweden, Spain and Holland forbade belligerent
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submarines to enter their territorial ·w aters except in case of
distress.
In olden tin1es n1any e...xtravagant claims "~ere put forward
by the various nations as to the lin1it of their territorial
waters, but since those days such claims have been drastically
modified and it is no'v generally recognized that no country
can properly claiin jurisdiction over large areas of ocean nor
the right to control or exclude the mo\eJ.nents of foreign
ships on' the high seas this applies equally to belligerent
operations though a belligerent can of course restrict his
operations of his own free ·will if he so wishes.
Since the Great War the in1portance of the limit of t~rri
torial waters has been brought to the notice of the public in
several ways, a1nong others by reason of the national Prohibition Act of An1erica. Resulting from discussions 'vith
Great Britain an agree1nent was reached in Washington in
192'4 whereby the United States was given a right to board
and examine any British vessel suspected of being engaged
in liquor smuggling at a distance from the coast that could be
traversed by that vessel in one hour.
By the san1e agreement Great Britain and America declared that it was their firm intention to uphold the principle
that three marine miles extending :from the coast line outwards and n1easured from low-water mark, should constitute
the proper limits of territorial waters. Sin1ilar agreements
were subsequently entered into by America "~ith Germany
and Sweden.
Certain bays, straits and canals have :fron1 time to ti1ne
been the subject o:f special international agreement so that
when questions o:f jurisdiction and sovereignty arise careful
reference n1ust be 1nade to any agreements applicable to the
particular case. The 'vidth o:f the general belt or ·te.rritorial
'vaters is no'v "~idely accepted as being three miles. Great
Britain in com1non with many other countries has long
refused to recognize claims to a territorial belt o:f great "ridth.
(New York Times, October 14, 1939.)

AMERICAN REPUBLICS' STATEMENT ON THE.
"GRAF VON SPEE" INCIDENT
Follo"~ing the procedure o:f consultation provided in the
Declaration o£ Pana1na, the 21 A1nerican republics have
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agreed upon the following staten1ent which the President of
the Republic of Panama has transmitted in their names to
the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Ger1nany :
"The American Governments are officially informed of
the naval engagement which took place on the thirteenth instant off the northeastern coast of Uruguay, between certain
British naval vessels and the Ger1nan vessel Graf Von Spee,
which, according to reliable reports, at~mpt.ed to overhaul
the French merchant vessel Formose· between Brazil and
the port of Montevideo after having sunk other merchant
vessels.
"They are also informed of the entry and scuttling of the
German warship in the waters of the River Plate upon the
ter1nination of the time limit which, in accordance 'vith the
rules of international law, 'vas granted to it by the Govern-ment of the Republic of Uruguay.
"On the other hand, the sinking or detention of German
merchant vessels by British vessels in American waters is
publicly known, as appears-to begin with-from the recent
cases of the Du~seldorf, U ssukuma, and others.
"All these facts which affect the neutrality of American
waters, compromise the aims of continental protection provided for by the Declaration of Panama of October 3, 1939,
the first paragraph of which establishes:
" 'As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality,
are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of
primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free
from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American
belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted
or made from land, sea, or air.'
"Therefore, in accordance with the method provided for in
that instrument and with a vie'v to avoiding the repetition
of further events of the nature to which reference is made
above, the American nations resolve to lodge a protest with
the belligerent countries and to initiate the necessary consultation in order to strengthen the system of protection in
common through the adoption of adequate rules, among
them those which 'vould prevent belligerent Yessels from
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supplying the1nselves and repairing damages in American
ports, 'vhen the said vessels have committed 'varlike acts
within the zone of security established in the Declaration of
Panama."
(Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 26, December
23, 1939, p. 723.)

BELLIGERENTS' REPLY TO NEUTRALITY ZONE
PROTEST

Great B1·itain:
1. His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom have
devoted most careful consideration to the communication
agreed upon unanimously by the twenty-one American republics, the text of which was telegraphed to His Majesty the
1\::ing by the Acting President of Pana1na on Dec. 23 last.
In that communication reference was made among other
matters to the recent naval action between British and German warships in the Sou~h Atlantic and to the maritime security zone described in the declaration at Panama on Oct. 3,
1939.
2. His ~1ajesty's Government, who themselves for so long
strove to prevent war, fully appreciate the desire of the American republics to keep war a'vay from shores of the American
Continent. It was, therefore, not merely 'vith interest but
with understanding that His l\fajesty's Government learned
of the maritime security zone proposal.
His Majesty's Government noted with satisfaction from the
Declaration of Panama itself that an attempt would be made
to base observance of its provisions upon the consent of the
belligerents. This fresh expression of adherence to the idea of
solving international difficulties by mutual discussion, which
always has been upheld by the American Republics, confirmed
His Majesty's Government's belief that these powers would
not attempt to enforce observance of the zone by .unilateral
action and encouraged their hope that it would be possible
to give effect, by means of negotiation, to the intentions 'vhich
inspired it.
3. It was in this spirit that His ~iajesty's Government were
. examining the proposal of the conference of Panama at the
time when the con1munication of Dec. 23 was received. In
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view of this con1munication, His l\1ajesty's Government desire
to draw attention of the American Republics to the following
considerations:
4. It will be apparent, in the first place, that the proposal,
involving as it does abandonment by belligerents of certain
legitimate belligerent rights, is not one which, on any basis of
int~rnational law, can be imposed upon them by unilateral
nctions and that its adoption requires their specific assent.
5. Acceptance by His l\faj esty's government of the suggestion that belligerents should forego their rights in the zone
must clearly be dependent upon their being satisfied that
adoption of the zone proposal would not provide German
warships and supply ships with vast sanctuary from which
they could emerge to attack Allied and neutral shipping~
to which they could return to avoid being brought into action
and in which acts of unneutral service might be performed
by German ships, for example, by using wireless communications.
It would also be necessary to insure that German warships and supply ships would not be enabled to pass with
impunity from one ocean to another through the zone, or
German merchantships to take part in inter-American trade
and earn foreign exchange which might be used in attempts
to promote subversion and sabotage abroad and procure supplies for prolongation of the war, thus depriving the Allies of
the fruits of their superiority at sea.
6. Moreover, acceptance of the zone proposals would have
to be on the basis that it should not constitute a precedent
for far-reaching alteration of existing laws on maritime
neutrality.
7. Unless these points are adequately safeguarded, the
zone proposals might only lead to accumulation of belligerent ships in the zone. This, in turn, might well bring the
risk of war nearer the American States and lead to friction between, on the one hand, the Allies, pursuing their
legitill\at~ beLligerent activities, a.nd, on the otl$r, the
American republics endeavoring to make this new policy
prevail.
8. The risk of such friction, which His Majesty's Government would be the first to deplore, would be increased by the
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application of sanctions. His ~fajesty's Government n1ust
emphatically repudiate any suggestion that His Majesty's
ships have acted or would act in any way that would justify
adoption by neutrals of punitive measures which do not
spring from accepted canons of neutral rights and obligations.
If, therefore, the American States were to adopt a schen1e
of sanctions for enforcement of the zone proposal they would,
in effect, be offering sanctuary to German warships within
which His Majesty's ships would be confronted with the
invidious choice of having either to refrain from engaging
their enemy or of laying themselves open to penalties in
. .~merican ports and ''aters.
9. Up to the present it does not appear that means have
been found by which disadvantages of the zone proposals
could be eliminated. That this is the case was sho,vn by
dperation in the zone of the warship Ad1niral Graf Spee
and the supply ship Taco1na. vVith regard to specific incidents, of which mention 'vas made in communications under
reply, His ~1ajesty's Government must observe that legitimate activities of His Majesty's ships can in no way i1nperil
but must rather contribute to the security of the Ame.rican
Continent, protection of which was the object of the framers
of the Declaration of Panama.
His Majesty's Government cannot admit that there is any
foundation for the claim that such activities have in any way
exposed them to justifiable reproach, seeing that the zone
proposal had not been n1ade effective and belligerent assent
had not yet been given to its operation.
10. In view of the difficulties described above, it appears
to His Majesty's Government that the only 1nethod of achieving the American object of preventing belligerent acts within
the zone would be: firstly, to ensure that the Ger1nan Govern1nent would send no n1ore 'varships into it; secondly, there
are obvious difficulties in applying the zone proposal at this
stage of the 'var 'vhen so much German shipping already
has taken refuge in An1erican waters.
If the Allies are asked to forego the opportunity of capturing these vessels it would also seem to be necessary that
247670-40-6
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they should be laid up under Pan-A1nerican control for the
duration of the war.
11. In the view of His ~fajesty's Government, it would
<>nly be by means such as those indicated that the wish of
American governments to keep \var away from their coasts
could be realized in a truly effective and equitable n1anner.
Until His ~fajesty's Government are able to feel assured
that the scheme will operate satisfactorily they must,
anxious as they are for fulfillments of American hopes,
necessarily reserve their full belligerent rights in order to
£ght the 1nenace presented by Ger1nan action of policy and
to defend that conception of law and that way of life which
they believe to be as dear to the people's governments of
America as they are to the people's govern1nents in the
British Co1nmonwealth of Nations.
(Department of State Bulletin, ol. 11, No. 35, February
24, 1940, pp. 199-201.)

'T

Fra,nce:
The French Government has attentively examined the Pananla President's communication of Dec. 23, following the
unani1nous accord of the t\venty -one American republics.
The communication referred to the naval action occurring
bet,veen British and German men-of-war after the [German
pocket battleship] Admiral Graf Spee attempted to reach the
French freighter F ormose in order to destroy it.
2. This communication refers to the desire manifested by
the A1nerican republics in their declaration of Panan1a to see
war excluded from the shores of the American continents.
The French Government, which for a long ti1ne has sought to
avoid war, fully appreciates the .American republics' desire
.and has examined in the most sympathetic spirit their proposal tending to the creation of a maritime security zone.
The French Government interprets the demarches made in
behalf of the American governments, including that of Dec.
23 as well as the previous communication of the Declaration of
Panama, as implying in the minds of the .American governments that the constitution of such a zone, involving Tenuncia tion by belligerent states of the exercise in vast territories
-of rights well established by international custom, could only
result from an accord between all the interested states.
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3. Recent facts discussed in the co1nmunication addressed
to the French Government in behalf of the twenty-one American republics clearly illustrate the situation which is to be
regulated. These facts proceed from the Ailrniral Graf
Spee's attempt to attack and destroy in the maritime security
zone the French cargoship Formose. It is clear that under
the present circumstances of war such attempts by German
vessels can have no effect upon the outcome of the war.
It is no less clear, however, that if such acts are committed
or attempted, France and Great Britain are strictly entitled
to carry out counter-attacks in useful time and that they cannot be asked to renounce that right. It follows that if the
security zone is to materialize as desired by the American governments, it is indispensable that the latter give the French
Government satisfactory assurance that the German Government will not send warships or supply ships into the zone.
The incontestable superiority France and Great Britain
have over Germany in the Atlantic and the Pacific has had
the result that many German cargo ships have been able to
escape legitimate exercise of the prize law only by taking
refuge in American ports. The institution of a security
zone ought not to have the effect of liberating them, thus
depriving the Allies of advantages following from their
naval superiority over Germany. Hence it ought to entail
effective measures taken by each American government calculated to keep German ships in ports where they have
taken refuge.
5. The American governments do not appear to envisage
or assume responsibpity to ensure in the vast spaces constituting their ne~trality zone repression of acts of hostile
assistance or un-neutral service. The possibility of such
acts is so great, especially in vie'v of radio communication,
that the French naval forces should not be deprived of the
right of preventing them and repressing them by all means
'vitl1in the limits of international law.
6. It is on this basis, if the American governments obtain
its acceptance by all belligerents, that realization of the aim
desired by the American governments ought to be sought,
in the opinion of the French Government.
7. The French Government realizes thatl in vie'v of the
novelty of methods and extension of the zone, divergence of
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vie\YS may arise in concrete cases. These 1night, at least, be
easily treated by diplo1natic channels i:£ one chooses to apply
the 1nethod of frank discussion and mutual accord regarding
principle as "~en as application. On the contrary, regrettable friction n1ight be pro-vo:Ked if unilateral procedure were
adopted, abandoning the habitual practice of nations.
These frictions 'vould be particularly gra-ve if they arose
fro1n punitive n1easures against ships not guilty of any infraction of international law. Refusal in such cases to grant
refuge or refueling possibilities to a warship would constitute an unpleasant contrast with the line of conduct that the
Uruguayan Governn1ent adopted with regard to the Ad1niral Graf Spee.
8. The French Governn1ent hopes by this exposition of
views to have contributed to realization of the ai1ns inspiring the t"·enty-one American republics. At the same ti1ne
it expects that the latter will admit that as long as no accord
is reached on the abo-ve basis the French Government retains
full exercise of a belligerent's rights based upon international law~ which n1ust enable it to safeguard the principles
of right and the conception of life which it shares with the
A1nerican govern1nents and peoples.
(Ibid. pp. 201-203.)
Ge~rnza1LY:

(1) The Gern1an GoYernment ''elco1nes the intention of
the An1erican Republics, expressed in the Declaration of
Panama, to maintain strict neutrality during the present conflict, and fully understands that they wish, as far as possible~
to take precautionary action against the effects of the present war on their countries and peoples.
(2) The Ger1nan Go-vernment believes itself to be in
agreement with the An1erican GoYernments that the regulations contained in the Declaration of Panama would 1nean a.
change in existing international law and infers fron1 the
telegram of October 4th of last year that it is desired to
settle this question in harmony with the belligerents. The
German Go-vernment does not take the stand that the hitherto recognized rules of international law ''ere bound to be
regarded as a rigid and fore-ver in1mutable order. It is
rather of the opinion that these rules are capable of and
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require adaptation to progressive developtnent and newly
arising conditions. In this spirit, it is also ready to take
up the consideration of the proposal of the neutral An1erican
Governments. However, it must point out that for the Gern1an naval vessels which have been in the proposed security
zone so far, only the rules of law now in effect could, of
course, be effective. The German naval vessels have held
most strictly to these rules of la'v during their operations.
'fherefore in so far as the protest submitted by the American
Governments is directed against the action of German 'varships, it cannot be · recognized by the German Government
as well grounded. It has already expressed to the Govern1nent of Uruguay its divergent interpretation of the law also
in the special case mentioned in the telegram of the Acting
President of the Republic of Pana1na of December 24th.
Besides, the German Government cannot recognize the right
of the Governments of the A1nerican Republics to decide
unilaterally upon measures in a manner deviating from the
rules hitherto in effect, such as are to be taken under consideration by the American Governtnents against the ships of the
belligerent countries which have committed acts of war
within the waters of the projected security zone, according
to the telegram of December 24th of last year.
( 3) Upon considering the questions connected with the
plan for the establishment of the security zone, there arises
first of all one important point which causes the situation
of Gern1any and the other belligerent powers to appear
disparate with respect to this: that is, while Germany has
never -pursued territorial aims on the American continent,
Great Britain and France have, however, during the course
of the last few centuries, established important possessions
and bases on this continent and the islands offshore, the practical importance of which also with respect to the questions
under consideration here does not require any further explanation. By these exceptions to the Monroe Doctrine in
favor of Great Britain and France the effect of the security
zone desired by the neutral American Govern1nents is fundamentally and decisively impaired to start with. The inequality in the situation of Ger1nany and her adversaries
that is produced hereby might perhaps be eliminated to
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a certain extent if Great Britain and France would pledge
the1nselves, under the guaranty of the American States,
not to make the possessions and islands mentioned the
starting points or bases for military operations; even if that
should come about the fact would still remain that one
belligerent state, Canada, not only directly adjoins the zone
mentioned in the 'vest and the east, but that portions of
Canadian territory are actually surrounded by the zone.
( 4) Despite the circun1stances set forth above, the German
Government, on its side, would be entirely ready to enter
into a further exchange of ideas with the Governments of
the American Republics regarding the putting into effect
of the Declaration of Panama. However, the German Government must assume fron1 the reply of the British and
French Govern1nents, recently published by press and radio,
that those two governments are not willing to take up seriously the idea of the security zone. The mere fact of the
setting up of demands according to which entrance into the
zone mentioned is not to be permitted to German warships,
while the warships of the adversaries are officially to retain
the right to enter the zone without restriction, shows such
a lack of respect for the most elementary ideas of internationallaw and imputes to the governments of the American states such a flagrant violation of neutrality that the
German Government can see therein only the desire of the
British and French Governments to do away with the basic
idea of the security zone, first of all.
( 5) Although the German Government is entirely ready
to enter into the proposals and suggestions of the An1erican
states in this field, the German Government can feel certain
of a success of the continuation of the plan of the security
zone only when the British and French position that has
been made known is fundamentally revised.
(Ibid. pp. 203-205.)

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DECLARATION
OF PANAMA

As previously indicated, there is evidence in the
practice of nations to support the assei"tion that,
i11 principle, 11eutral states may exercise their au-
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thority over foreign ships beyond the territorial
limits with the aim of protecting their shores from
the effects of belligerent operations~ How far may
neutrals exercise their authority over the vessels of
warring powers~ No definite answer can be given
to this query. It must be remembered that the
neutrals' jurisdiction is one strictly limited to the
ends of national defense; the net1tral may not exercise general authority over belligerent warships
Olltside of the area of territorial waters, but has
a right to adopt only those measures which clearly
are required to safeguard neutral life and property.
Upon the high seas, by imn1emorial right, the belligerent may visit and search neutral craft, may
capture enemy merchant ships, and may attack
enemy 'varships. The neutral claims as to defense
may thllS come into direct conflict with a belligerent's rights upon the high seas. Neutral defense
jurisdiction must thus be narrowly circumscribed
and must not exceed the genuine requirements of
domestic safety. The principle of contiguous
zones for neutrals is probably crystallizing, but
there is certainly no law concerning the extent of
such areas. Belligerents have the legal right to
challenge each specific assertion of jurisdiction,.
and a neutrality zone cannot be said to have been
accepted into internatio11allaw as long as other nations withhold their assent. The ability of the Ileutral to patrol the area involved and to exercise the
jllrisdiction claimed is also an important factor.
Belligerents naturally would be reluctant to refrain
from hostility in 'vide areas i11 'vl1ich a neutral
could not possibly man1tain any reasonable degree
of authority. So1ne fairly close corresponde11ce
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111ust exist bet,veen the clain1s to authority and the
ability to exercise authority.
The Declaration of Panama is not a part of international law. Neutral jurisdiction for defense
purposes over a part of the ocean extending 300
miles from the coast is 'vithout precedent and has
not been generally accepted. There is agreement
probably upon the principle but not upon its application to such a tremendously wide belt. Great
Britain, France, and Germany were acting within
tl1eir legal rights when they refused to recog1rize
the binding nature of the Panama Declaration.
Only the status of that Declaration in international
law is being discussed here; its feasibility politieally or otherwise is an entirely separate problen1.
APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE

Thot1gh the protective zone proclaimed by State
K is of doubtful standing in international law, the
commander of the cruiser Kon~lo must obey tl1e
orders of his home government and should use
force if necessary to protect the V e'ra from attack
by the Union. State U, however, may protest to
State K and may claim that it has been deprived of
one of its legitimate belligerent rights. State K
cannot mal{e international la'v unilaterally. Its
protective zone is not necessarily binding upon belligerents, and if these latter reft1se to accord recognition to the zone, State K may well be held liable
for an infringement upon the rights of the states at
war. In this instance, however, a zone extending
100 miles from the exits of a canal, that is, a zone
proclaimed within a fairly limited area and having
a close relation to the canal's defense requirements,
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seems to have a much better chance of obtai11ing
universal acceptance than the far more extensive
claims put forth in the Declaratio11 of Panama.
The fact that State K could doubtless patrol sucl1
an area in reasonably effective fashion makes the
project a rather feasible one. Therefore i11 time
State K might persuade other nations to accord
it recognition, but, at the moment, the belligerent
powers are under no obligation to look upon it as.
la,v.
NEUTRALITY OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

Prior to the outbreak of war in September 1939t
there '\Vas considerable discussion concerni11g the
legal authority of the British Dominions to be neutral in any war in wl1ich Great Britain was a belligerent. Common ties with the Crown, commo11
British citizenship, and special military and naval
rights of Great Britain within Dominion territories were among the factors which seemed to preclude the possibility that some parts of the British
Commonwealtl1 of Nations could remain aloof
from a conflict in which other portions of tl1e Coi11monwealtl1 were engaged. The Union of South
Africa, however, made provision in its Constitution
ii11926 that the Union never could be at war without the consent of its own Parliament, and Article
28 of the Irish Free State Constitution, whicl1 went
into effect on December 29, 1937, lil{e,vise pro-·
vided that the Free State could not be involved
in 'var save by its own will. (Constitutio11 of Ireland, Article 28, section 3, subsection 1. H. JVI. Stationery Office, Cortstit~ttions of All Coulntries, Vol.
I: The British Empire, p. 206.) By the Treaty of
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April25, 1938, between Great Britain and the Irish
Free State (Eire, Treaty Series, 1938, No. 1) the
former surrendered to. the latter all atlthority over
the naval bases of Berebave11, Cobb, and Lough
Swilly, ports which the British had kept 'vithin
their jurisdiction in the Articles of Agreement of
December 6, 1921, between the Free State and Great
Britain. As a result of these constitutional provisions and treaty arrangements, the legal obstacles
in the way of adoption of neutrality by the Free
State and the Union of South Africa had been
Jargely removed, though the obligations of the latter
i11 regard to the naval base at Simondstown still
-continued to complicate matters for the Union
Government. The other Dominions, Canada, Australia, and N e'v Zealand, lacked legislation on the
subject of neutrality. It was thought in some
quarters that a Dominion might adopt a position
of ''passive'' 11eutrality, a status with implications
of much ambiguity for international law.
In the main, however, the neutrality of the Dominions depends upon the facts in any given situation. If a Dominion declares that it is ne11tral
and if the belligerents recognize it as neutral, then
tit is neutral. It is a question of actuality 11ot
theory, as was demonstrated by the events of September 1939. On September 2, the Dail Eireann
approved Prime Minister de Valera's policy of
neutrality, and on September 3, the German Minister to Dublin, Dr. Eduard He1npel, informed the
President that the Germa11 Government would respect 'E ire's neutrality provided that neutrality
was adhei-.ed to. Ireland's neutrality thus became
a reality on the day on which hostilities were de.clared. (The London Times, September 4, 1939.}
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A subject 'vhich arose for consideration shortly
after the commenceme11t of the 'var was merchant
shipping registration. Sn1ce Ireland had declared
neutrality and since this status had been immediately accepted by all belligerents, it appeared at
first that ships having Irish registry would probably welcome the right to use the Irish flag since
this should be respected as a neutral flag in accord
with the provisions of international law. Indeed
it would have been thought that Ireland would have
been confronted with the problem of British ships
seeking registry, a matter which would ordinarily
present no problem, but which might draw sharp
German protest if permitted after the outbreak
of war.
. On the contrary, one ship was transferred from
Irish to British registry while at sea and was
sunk by a German submarine when allegedly flying
the Irish flag, possibly innocently, since it might not
have been informed of the change of registry. In
addition, other ships were transferred and in some
instances the transfers appear to have been made
at the insistence of the crews, who were reported
to have expressed a preference for sailing under
the British flag.
"In the dispatch of the 15th it was reported that three
British and Irish Steam Packet Company mail ships had
transferred from Irish to British registry, while on the 19th
a similar transfer of three L. M.S. ships was announced and
the probable transfer of other ships of the same line, then
registered in Dublin, 'vas predicted. In the case of the
L. ~f. S. ships, the reason given for transfer was the refusal
of the crews to sail, since otherwise they feared that, if sunk,
their dependents would not be compensated for injury or
loss of life."
(The London Times, September 19, 1939.)
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By the end of September, according to a Teport
made to Dail Eireann by Mr. MacEntee, Minister
of Commerce and Industry, 18 ships had been withdrawn from Irish and transferred to British registry. These sb).ps, all owned by two companies,
incorporated in Great Britain, accounted for a
large portion of the shipping tonnage which had
been under Irish registry under the Mercha11t Shipping Act, 1894. (Eire, Dail Eireann, Parliamelltary Debates, Official Report, September 27, 1939,
col. 220-221.)
The Parlian1ent of the Union of South Africa
on September 5, 1939, rejected the proposal of
Prime Minister Hertzog that relations with the
belligerent countries remain unchanged by a vote
of 80 to 66, and the Union entered the war on the
side of Great Britain llnder the leadership of a 11ew
cabinet headed ;by General Smuts. (New York
Times, September 6, 1939.) The Prime Ministers
of Australia and New Zealand a11nounced on September 3 that their Dominions were at war 'vith
Germany (New York Times, September 4, 1939),
and also at Ottawa on September 3, 1939, it was
announced by the Government that Canada was at
war with Germany according to the principle that
"when Britain is at war, Canada is at war.'' (Ne'v
York Times, September 4, 1939.) However, this
governmental statement 'vas not followed by any
forn1al declaration of 'var, Canada was 11ot incll1ded
as a belligerent in President Roosevelt's first neutrality proclamation on September 5, and it 'vas
not until September 10, 1939, that Canada by Parliamentary action formally became a belligerent.
What the exact status of Canada was from Septe111ber 3 to Septen1ber 10 is something for lawyers
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to investigate, but the fact ren1ains that Canada,
along 'vith three other Domi11ions, was not neutral
at any time, and that the Irish Free State succeeded
in its attempt to follow the line of neutrality.
In Situation II, therefore, if the Dominion of
Vinta is the Irish Free State, the Vincent is a
cruiser of a neutral power and may remain indefinitely in the canal port. If Vinta, however, happens to be Canada, New Zealand, Australia, or the
Union of South Africa, the Vincent should be
treated as a belligerent warship and should be subject to all the neutrality regulations as to length
of stay, repairs, supplies, etc.
AIRPLANES IN NEUTRAL TERRITORY

It can now be said to be international law that
belligerent war planes have no right to fly into or
through neutral jurisdiction. The subjacent neutral state has complete jurisdiction over the air,
and the practice of neutrals in the last war and
the provisions of codes and conventions since that
time established the fact that the military pla11es
of belligerents are barred from flight in neutral
air. Naval airplanes attached to a warship are
considered to be a part of the ship as long as they
are in contact with the vessel. Such planes, therefore, if actually on board a 'varship, may enter a
neutral harbor, but they may not leave the 'varvessel to fly over the neutral's domain. (See Spaight,
"Air Power and War Rights'' pp. 421-433.)
Fron1 1914 to 1918 The Netherlands, Switzerland,
and other neutrals barred belligerent military
planes from their superadjacent air and enforced
their prohibitions by gunfire. (See N·a val War
College, International Law Situations, 1936, pp.
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74-75.)
that:

The United States proclaimed in 1915

Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, are forbidden to descend or arise with the jurisdiction of the United
States at the Canal Zone or to pass through the air spaces
above the lands and 'vaters within said jurisdiction. (Naval
''Tar College, International Law Situations, 1915, p. 14; see
also Proclamation of May 23, 1917 .Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, 1917, p. 245.)

_The Conimissio11 of Jurists report of 1923 stipulates that:
.A-t\_rticle 40: Belligerent 1nilitary aircraft are forbidden to
enter the jurisdiction of a neutral state.
Article 41: Aircraft on board vessels of 'var, including
aircraft carriers, shall be regarded as part of such vessels.
Article 42: A neutral government must use the means at
its disposal to prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of
belligerent military aircraft and to compel the1n to alight if
they have entered such jurisdiction.
A neutral governn1ent shall use the means at its disposal
to intern any belligerent military aircraft which is 'vithin its
jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason 'vhatsoever, together with its crew and the passengers,.if any.

Harvard Draft Code, Rights and Duties of N eutral States i11 Naval and Aerial War, op. cit.
declares:
Article 94: A neutral State shall require a belligerent military aircraft which is in its territory at the tilne of outbreak
of war, to depart therefrom within twelve hours. The neutral State shall use the means at its ·disposal to intern
belligerent military aircraft found in its territory after the
expiration of this period.
Article 95 : A neutral State shall use the means at its
disposal:
(a) To prevent belligerent n1ilitary aircraft fron1 entering its territory; and
(b) to compel the1n to alight if they have ente.red, and ·
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(c) To intern them after they have alighted, 'vhether the
landing be voluntary or forced, together 'vith persons and
property on board.

The Havana Co11vention on Maritime Neutrality,
1928, (Hudson li1ternational Legislation Vol. IVt
p. 2401), states in .Article 14 that:
The airships of belligerents shall not fly above the territory or the territorial "raters of neutrals if it is not in conformity with the regulations of the latter.

From the Danish rules 011 neutrality, .Article 8;
of 1938 (Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality, .American Journal of International Law, October 1938,
Official Documents, p. 145) ~ comes again a similar
statement declaratory of international law on this
subject:
l\filitary aircraft of the belligerents, with the exception of
aerial ambulances and aerial transports on board warships,
shall not be admitted into Danish territory, except "~hen
regulations to the contrary apply or may become applicable
so far as certain spaces are concerned conformable to the
general principles of international law.

In his proclamation prescribing regulations concerning neutrality in the Canal Zone, September
5, 1939, (See the appendix of this volume for the
complete proclamation) the President stated that:
No belligerent aircraft shall be navigated into, 'vi thin, or
through the air spaces above the territory or waters of the
Canal Zone.

NEUTRAL TERRITORY AS A BASE

One of the rules fundamental to the entire legal
edifice of neutrality is tl1at which specifies that neutral territory shall not be used as a base of 1nilitary
or naval operations, and neutral po,vers are reqliired to use the 1nea11s at their disposal to prevent
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Sllch employ1ne11t on the behalf of one of the belligerents. Expeditions are not to set forth from or
sail from neutral jurisdiction, and neutrals must
endeavor to prevent a belligerent fleet from using
neutral territory as a base of supplies or as a source
of military information and guidance. For these
reasons belligerents may not erect or operate radio
stations on neutral soil and must not attempt to
obtain information by means of special signals or
messengers coming from neutral jurisdiction. A
neutral state is not bound to prevent the transmission of information by means of cable, coastal comn1unication or telecommunication other than radio.
The distinction between radio, messengers and
mechanical signal devices on the one hand, and
cables, mail and telecommunications on the other,
is based upon the fact that the former can be so
easily employed for the relaying of important illformation to a belligerent fleet or force outside of
neutral jurisdiction, and also to the fact that such
n1ethods of communication are almost impossible for
the other belligerent to intercept or prevent, whereas cables and tl1e postal services can scarcely be
11sed to direct belligerent operations from neutral
territory and also may be cut or intercepted by
the opposi11g belligerent.
Neutrals are no"\v ·Under the obligation to prevent
the fitting out and arming of planes and the departure of such military airplanes from their territory, a rule comparable to that evolved in regard
to surface vessels at the time of the Alaban1a Clain1s
..A.rbitration in the last century. ''An expedition
n1ay consist of a single airplane if manned and
equipped in a manner which would enable it to
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take part in hostilities.'' (From the comn1e11t 011
Article 46 of the Committee of Jurists Report,
1923, op. cit.) The Government of the United
States \Vas confronted with the problem of preventing the departure of airplanes equipped and ready
for n1ilitary operations after the repeal of the socalled Arms Embargo on November 4, 1939. (Staten1e11t, in Appendix, on flights of military aircraft,
Dece1nber 7, 1939.) An airpla11e in a condition to
111ake a hostile attack could not legally be permitted
to leave American jurisdiction, and certainly the
United States could not permit the departure of a
1nilitary or 11aval belligerent plane carrying a Illessenger to a cruiser of a belligerent po\ver. The
rules i11 regard to the flight of belligerent military
planes over neutral territory and those forbidding
the use of neutral territory as a base \vould be
violated if such an event \vere permitted to occur.
NEUTRALITY LAW RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF
AMERICAN PORTS: NOVEMBER 4, 1939
Sec. 10 (a)-,Vhenever, during any 'var in 'vhich the
United States is neutral, the President, or any person thereunto authorized by him, shall have cause to believe that any
vessel~ do1nestic or foreign, 'vhether requiring clearance or
not, is about to carry out of a port or from the jurisdiction
of the United States, fuel, men, arms, ammunition, iinplements of ''ar, supplies, dispatches, or information to any
'varship, tender, or supply ship of a State na1ned in a proclaInation issued under the authority of Section 1 (a), but the
evidence is not dee1ned sufficient to justify forbidding the
departure of the vessel as provided for by Section 1, Title V,
Chapter 30, of the act approved June 15, 1V17 ( 40 Stat. 217,
221; U. S. C., 193± Edition, Title 18, Sec. 31), and if, in the
President's judgn1ent, such action 'vill serve to n1aintain
peace bet,Yeen the United States and foreign States, or to
247670-40-7
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protect the con11nercial interests of the United States and
its citizens, or to promote the security or neutrality of the
United States, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty
to require the owner, master, or person in con1mand thereof,
before. departing from a port or from the jurisdiction of the
United States, to give a bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, in such amount as he shall deem proper, conditioned that the vessel will not deliYer the n1en, or any fuel,
supplies, dispatches, information, or any part of the cargo,
to any "\Yarship, tender, or supply ship of a State ntunecl in a
proclamation issued under the authority of Section 1 (a).
(b) If the President, or any person thereunto authorized
by hin1, shall find that a vessel, do1nestic or foreign, in a port
of the United States has previously departed fron1 a port or
fro1n the jurisdiction of the. United States during such "-ar
and delivered men, fuel, supplies, dispatches, infor1nation
or any part of its cargo to a "rarship, tender or supply ship of
a State na1ned in a proclamation issued under the authority
of Section 1 (a) he may prohibit the departure of such
vessel during the duration of the "\Yar.
(c) 'Vhenever the President shall have issued a proclaInation under Section 1 (a) he may, while such procla1nation
is in effect, require the owner, n1aster or person in conunancl
of any vessel, foreign or do1nestic, before departing fro1n the
United StatBs, to give a bond to the United States, with
sufficient sureties, in such amount as he shall dee1n proper,
conditioned that no alien sea1nan who arrived on such
vessel shall ren1ain in the United States for a longer period
than that pern1itted under the regulations, as a1nended from
tilne to tin1e, issued pursuant to Section 33 of the In11nigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917 (U. S. C., Title 8, Sec. 168). Sotwithstanding the provisions of said section, he 1nny issue
regulations "\Yith respect to the landing of such sea1nen as
he dee1ns necessary to insure their departure either on such
vessel or another vessel at the expense of such o"\vner, n1aster
or person in command.
(Public resolution No. 54, 76th Cong., 2d sess.)
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PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION SEPTEMBER 5,
1939

.A1nong the acts forbidden by proclamatio11 of
the President on September 5, 1939, \Vere the following:
11. l(no,vingly beginning or setting on foot or providing
or preparing a means for or furnishing the money for~ or
taking part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise
to be carried on fron1 the territory or jurisdiction of the
United States against the territory or don1inion of a bel..ligerent.
12. Dispatching fro1n the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, any vessel, domestic or foreign, 'vhich is about to carry to a 'varship, tender or supply
ship of a belligerent any fuel, arms, ammunition, men, supplies, dispatches or inforn1ation shipped or receiYed on board
'vithin the jurisdiction of the United States.
( 4 Federal Register, p. 3809.)

CODES AND CONVENTIONS ON USE OF
NEUTRAL TERRITORY

.Article 3 of Hague Convention V of 1907 a11d
article 5 of Hague Convention XIII, 1907, co11taii1
provisions which forbid belligerents to erect \vireless telegraphy stations on neutral soil or to employ
neutral ports and waters as a base of 11aval operations. .Article 3 of the Havana Convention 011
Maritime Neutrality, op. cit., contains a lil{e prohibition. .Article 46 of the previously cited Jurists
Report deals \vith the subject of departure of belligerent airplanes, and in sectj 011 2 of the san1e
article provides that the neutral is bound "to prevent the departure of an aircraft the cre\V of \vhich
includes any member of the con1batant forces of a
belligerent po\ver. '' Relevant articles fron1 the
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Harvard Draft Code on Neutrality, op. cit., are as
follO\VS:
~<-\..rticle

9: ( 1) a neutral State shall use the n1eans at its
disposal to preYent:
(a) the erection or operation of any radio station
"~ithin its jurisdiction by a belligerent; and
(b) the transn1ission from its jurisdiction of 1nilitary
infor1nation destined for a belligerent by radio or
by mechanical means of co1n1nunication.
(2) A neutral State is not bound to use the n1eans at its
disposal to prevent the transmission from its territory of
military infor1nation destined for a belligerent by means of
postal comn1unication, telecon11nnnications other than radio,
1nessengers or other 1neans of con1munication not provided
for in section ( 1) of this article.
Article 99: A neutral state shall use the n1eans at its disposal:
(a) T'o preYent the fitting out or ar1ning "\Yithin its territory of an aircraft 'vhich is intended to engage in hostile
operations against a belligerent;
(b) To preYent, subject to Article 94, the flight fron1 its
territory of any aircraft 'vhich is intended to engage in hostile operations against a belligerent or "\Yhich is intended to
perform services of a n1ilitary character for a belligerent.

UNITED STATES TREATY WITH PANAMA

On July 26, 1939, a general treaty between the
United States and Panama, signed at vVashington
011 Niarch 2, 1936, \vas proclaimed by the Preside11t
and \vent into effect on that day. This treaty provided for a revision i11 certain particulars of the
United States-Panama Treaty of 1903 (Treaty Series No. 431) and also contained provisions supplementary to the earlier agreement. A summary
of the articles of the treaty, as printed in the Departn1ent of State Bulletin (Vol. I, No. 5, July 29,
1939, pp. 83-85) is as follows:
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Article I establishes a basis of friendship and cooperation
bet,Yeen Panama and the United States.
Article II. The co1npliance of Panama 'Yith the provisions
of article II of the convention of N oven1ber 18, 1903, in
turning over to the United States additional lands and "·aters beyond those specifically mentioned there is recognized.
The requirement of further lands and ""aters is considered
i1nprobable by both Goveriunents, but they nevertheless
recognize their joint obligation to insure the continuous
operation of the Canal and agree to reach the necessary
understanding should additional lands and 'vaters be in fact
necessary for this purpose.
Article III contains various provisions restricting the
co1nmercial activities of the United States in the Canal Zone
in order that Panan1a 1nay take advantage of the. commercial
opportunities inherent in its geographical situation. In this
article are listed the classes of persons 'vho n1ay reside in
the Canal Zone and the persons 'vho are entitled to Inake
purchases in the Canal Zone commissaries.
Article IV provides for the free entry of Inerchandise
entering Panama destined for agencies of the United States
Govern1nent and provides that no taxes shall be in1 posed
upon persons in the service of the United States entering
Pana1na or upon residents of Panan1a entering the Canal
Zone.
Article V provides that port facilities other than those
o'vned by the Panama Railroad Co. in the ports of Panan1a
and Colon Inay be operated only by Pa.nan1a; exempts fron1
Panamanian taxation vessels using the Canal which do not
touch at ports under Pana1nanian jurisdiction; and provides
for the establish1nent of Panamanian customhouses 'vithin
the Canal Zone. The United States undertakes to adopt
such administrative regulations as 1nay be necessary to assist
Panama in controlling iininigration into that country.
Article 'li revises article VII of the convention of November 18, 1903, in that the United States renounces the
right to acquire, by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, lands or properties in or near the cities of Panamtl,
and Colon, although retaining the right to purchase necessary lands or properties. The third paragraph of the said
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article VII, granting the United States the right to interYene in the cities of Pana1na and Colon and the territory
adjacent thereto for the purpose of maintaining order, is
abrogated.
Article VII provides that beginning 'vith the 1934 annuity
payn1ent the annual amounts of these payn1ents shall be four
hundred thirty thousand balboas (B/430,000.00) or the equiYalent thereof. In a supplementary exchange of notes the
balboa is defined as having a gold content equal to that of
the present United States dollar .
...-\.rticle \TIII provides for a corridor under Panamanian
jurisdiction to connect the city of Colon with other territory
of Panama .
..:-\..rticle IX establishes a si1nilar corridor under American
jurisdiction to connect the l\Iadden Dam area with the Canal
Zone proper .
...t\.rticle X provides that in case of mnergency both GovernInents will take such measures of prevention and defense as
they 1nay consider necessary for the protection of their common interests.
~-\.rticle XI reserves to each country all rights enjoyed by
Yirtue of treaties now in force between the two countries, and
preserves all obligations therein established, with the exception of those rights and obligations specifically revised by
the present treaty. The juridical status of the Canal Zone, as
defined in article III of the 1903 convention, thereby remains
unaltered.
Article XII provides that the treaty shall take effect imn1ediately on the exchange of ratifications in vVashington.
There "·ere 16 exchanges of notes signed on March 2, 1936,
and 1 signed on February 1, 1939, interpreting and defining
certain provisions of the General Treaty. These notes will
be printed in ,.freaty Series No. 945.
On the occasion of the exchange of ratifications of the General Treaty Between the United States and Panama, signed
l\Iarch 2, 1936, the Secretary of State made the following
ren1arks:
"The present occasion marks an important milestone in our
relations with the Republic of Panama. It will be recalled
that the convention of 1903 was drafted at a time when the
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Pana1na Canal was only a drea1n and that consequently it was
i1npossible to foresee and to provide for the n1any varied
phases of our relations ·with Pana1na 'vhich ''ould spring
fro1n the continuous operation of the Canal and its attendant
'Yorks and establishtnents.
"Dissatisfaction on the part of the Republic of Panama
''ith certain of the proYisions of the convention of 1903 arose
early, and various atten1pts 'vere made, many of them successful, to solYe certain specific probletns either informally or by
agreetnent. The present General Treaty is the result of many
painstaking hours of negotiation and preparation. It is a
doctunent which we hope responds to the genuine and legitilnate aspirations of the Government and people of Panama
yet which not only continues existing safeguards and provisions for the operation, n1aintenance, sanitation, and protection of the Canal from our point of view, but by associating
the Republic of Pana1na in this work, accords even greater
security and efficiency to the Canal, either in its present form
or should it become necessary, in an expanded form."
(Treaty Series, No. 945.)

APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE

Inasmuch as State K has the san1e rights in the
Canal Zone leased fro1n State L as those possessed
by the United States in the Pana1na Canal Zone,
State I{, though 11ot possessing title to the zone,
has all the at1thority which it would have if it were
the true sovereig11. State I{ as a neutral is therefore responsible for 'vhat transpires in the zone
and must uphold the obligations of a neutral under
internationalla,v. The Vigo} a belligerent cruiser,
had no right to send the airplane V-1} a n1ilitary
craft, i11to neutral territory a11d the V -1 should
have been interned by State I{ authorities. Not
only 'vas the initial entry of the V -1 a violation
of the neutrality of State J(, but also its departure
\vas a11 illegal act which State I{ should have used
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the means at its disposal to prevent. The V -1,
equipped for war and ..capable of engaging in hostile
action, constituted an expedition. Transportation
of the naval attacl1e of the legation of tl1e belligerent State V wl1o had important information to
transn1it to the commander of the Vigo, rendered
the action all the more culpable. The territory of
State I( 'vas being used as a base both by the departure of a plane ready for war use and by the
sending of a special messenger conveying 111ilitary
communications to the commander of a belligerent
warship at sea.
It is true that the attache e11joys ft1ll diplon1atic
immunities a11d it is also true that State I( is u11der
110 obligation to prevent couriers from carrying
messages to a foreign government, but tl1is last
stateme11t refers to regular diplomatic correspondence and not to directing operations of ships at
sea. The attache is not permitted under international law to engage in activities which involve violations of the neutrality of the state to "rhich he
]s accredited. Had the Vigo co111e into a canal
port, the attache could legally have gone on board
if he had so desired, but flying otlt to a 'varship
of his nation is an entirely different matter and
one that very definitely turns the territory of the
zone i11to a belligerent base of operations. If tl1e
Vigo had been in distress, it could have come i11to
port itself or else it could have radioed to those on
shore for help and needed Stlpplies. The authorities
of neutral State I( are bou11d to succor and relieve
tl1e distress, if genuine, of vessels at sea a11d n1ight
have sent out one of their own planes or ships to
render aid. Officials of State K, ho,vever, 111ust in
110 'vay implement the fighti11g capacity of the TTigo
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&Ild must draw the line very carefully bet\vee11 aid
to a ship in distress and permitting a belligerent
'varship to increase its fighti11g ability. In this
situation, therefore, State I( must not countenance
the flight of a belligerent naval airplane into its
jurisdiction and is under an obligation to prevent
such craft and important messages from being
transn1itted to a belligerent fleet off its coast. The
tactics of the Vigo, the V -1 and the naval attache
are gravely suspect. The needed medical supplies
could l1ave been obtained in ways which did not
jnvolve the n~utrality rights and obligations of
State I( in the Canal Zone.
RESU~iE

The principle of contiguous zones appears to
have been established in international law, but no
consensus exists as to what the widths of such areas,
especially those for defense purposes, ought to be.
The Declaration of Panama which asserted jurisdictioi1 for purposes of neutrality patrol over parts
of the sea to a distance 300 miles from the shore
is not binding in international law, though the
procla1nation may 'vell have been justified for political or other reasons. In regard to the status of
the British Dominions, a11 era of academic questionings came to an end when the Irish Free State
declared its neutrality on September 3, 1939, and
'vas regarded as a neutral by all the belligerents.
It has been proved that the British Dominions ca1L
be neutral because one of them actually has been
nelltral. Concerning other aspects of neutrality
the introduction of the airplane has resulted in the
n1aki11g of so1ne new rules and in the adaptation of
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some of the former ones, to a new instrument of
\va.rfare. Belligerent military airplanes, unlike
belligerent surface craft, are barred entirely from
11eutral jurisdiction. The actual practice of states
in the last war led to the creation of this ne\v prohibition. When it come to the departure of planes
from neutral jurisdiction, the rules in regard to
''fitting out a11d arming'' have been taken over and
applied to aircraft. Neutrals 111ust use the means
at their disposal to keep planes from leaving which
are in a condition to take part in a military
operation.
SOLUTION

(a) The commander of the l\.o1nlo should act to

l)rotect the v erra, thus conforn1ing to the domestic
law of his own state. The legality of the protective
zo11e u11der international la\v depends upon its acceptance by other powers. In this instance, therefore, the protective zone is not recognized by inter11atio11al la\v and State U may attempt to hold
State K internationally responsible.
(b) It is legally possible for \Tinta to be a neutral
state. If tl1e Dominion of Vinta is recognized as
a 11eutral by the belligerents, the V1:ncent may ren1ain in the canal ports indefinitely.
( c} The V -1 has no right to enter neutral jurisdiction and the authorities of State I( in the c·anal
Zone should have used the n1eans at their disposal
to prevent the departure of V-1.
(d) States L, U, and V are not obliged to recognize the zone and their protests are legally valid.

